Segmentation between domestic and foreign investors is not uncommon. What distinguishes China's stock markets is that domestic A shares have traded at a significant premium over foreign B shares, and the premium appears to be driven by a stochastic trend. In other markets with segmentation between domestic and foreign investors through dual classes of shares, foreign shares typically trade at a premium over domestic shares, and the premium is stationary. In the Chinese stock markets, where direct arbitrage is forbidden and information can only be exchanged through observed prices, the two investor groups seem to determine prices independently.
Chinese stock prices have been analysed in a number of papers. Mookerjee and Yu (1999) report violations of the efficient market hypothesis. They find both autocorrelation and seasonality in returns. Beginning with Bailey (1994) , price discovery and information diffusion between domestic and foreign investors have been the subjects of many papers. Chui and Kwok (1998) investigate the cross-autocorrelation of A and B share returns. They find that returns on B shares lead returns on A shares, which may reflect an information advantage of foreign investors. Sjöö and Zhang (2000) find that the direction of information diffusion is determined by the choice of stock exchange (Shanghai or Shenzhen).
Chakravarty, Sarkar and Wu (1998), and Bergström and Tang (2001) argue that the A share price premium is caused by segmentation and information differences, and present empirical support for the segmentation hypothesis. In contrast, Fernald and Rogers (2002) argue that the premium is consistent with the simple asset pricing model and a difference in expected returns by domestic and foreign investors.
We would expect price discovery to force the share prices of the same firm to converge, so that the A and B share prices of the same firm are cointegrated.
1
Sjöö and Zhang find that it is difficult to reject the hypothesis of no cointegration between A and B share prices using formal tests of cointegration.
This Though domestic investors are able to trade both classes of shares, arbitrage opportunities for them are limited. Short selling is forbidden for both A and B shares in China's stock markets. The Chinese Yuan is not freely convertible, and domestic investors cannot freely buy foreign exchange. Moreover, in order to be able to trade B shares, an investor must open a bank account that is only used for trading B shares. Foreign exchange in such an account must be transferred from foreign banks.
2
We therefore argue that the A and B share markets are still segmented.
There are 1180 Chinese firms listing A shares and 114 firms listing B shares on either the Shanghai or Shenzhen stock exchanges, as of July 2002.
3
Not every firm can issue B shares. Only firms that get permission from the authorities are allowed to issue B shares. In this paper only firms listing both A and B shares on either of the stock exchanges are included in the data. The sample consists of 88 firms, 44 of which are listed on the Shanghai stock exchange and We have constructed indices of A and B share prices on the Shanghai and Shenzhen stock markets (denoted P SHA t , P SHB t , P ZHA t and P ZHB t , respectively) by computing the monthly averages of the individual firms' share prices and then averaging over all firms in each market. The indices are unweighted, but the construction mimics the construction of the official indices. We cannot simply use the official indices, since the A share price indices include all firms listing A shares and there are many firms that do not issue B shares. We calculate the premia of A share prices over B share prices as P SHAB t = (P SHA t −P SHB t )/P SHB t and P SZAB t 
Pricing of Chinese A and B Shares
This section discusses possible sources behind the observed non-stationary A share price premium. Equity prices can be understood as the discounted sum of expected cash flow to equity holders
The present share price (P
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) is the discounted sum of the conditional expectation of dividend per share (D t
is some information set at time t = 0 and R i j is the discount rate. Formally, the set {F t , i
: t ≥ 0} is a filtration, i.e. an increasing family of sub-σ-fields. We assume that the dividend process {D t } is adapted to {F t , i
}. The risk-adjusted discount rate R i j can vary over time and between the two investor groups. Observed differences between the A and B share prices are explained by different discount rates (R i j
) and different information sets (F
). Starting with the discount rate, the standard argument is that foreign investors require lower returns to include Chinese stocks in their portfolios. Foreign investors can take advantage of international diversification and attain a better trade-off between risk and return. They will therefore pay a higher price for Chinese stocks. This argument is of limited interest for Chinese A and B share prices. Chinese capital markets are segmented through various foreign exchange controls, and international capital flows will not equalise expected real returns between China and the rest of the world. In this environment, foreign investors might require additional compensation for inflation, exchange and sovereign risks. The choice of a Chinese investor is no diversification or some diversification, by investing in the domestic stock markets. Thus, a local investor might be willing to pay a relatively high price per share in order to achieve diversification of his or her portfolio.
We now turn to the question whether domestic and foreign investors have the same expectations about a firm's future cash flow, conditional on their information sets. We start with the argument that domestic investors are better informed. Then we can assume
. Chakravarty, Sarkar and Wu (1998), following Grossman and Stiglitz (1980) , develop a model of the pricing of A and B shares when markets are segmented and investors have different information. Their model predicts that A shares will trade at a discount if there is segmentation, but no information differences. The result changes if domestic and foreign investors have different information. As the degree of information asymmetry increases, A shares will begin to trade at a premium if domestic investors have better information.
Compared with Western firms, the accounting standards of Chinese firms are poor (Sze, 1993 and Xiang, 1998) . All investors are faced with the problem of obtaining information about individual firms. However, a diversified foreign investor is not necessarily looking for firm specific information, but for information concerning non-diversifiable risk factors. Some authors argue that foreign investors have an advantage in obtaining information. Then we can assume
. Chui and Kwok (1998) argue that due to information barriers, foreign investors receive news faster than local investors. Sjöö and Zhang (2000) argue that information provided by local sources is of low quality. Foreign investors can in addition be assumed to have better knowledge and be more experienced in pricing risky investment.
Most of the factors discussed above explain why we observe a premium on A shares. The interesting question is whether these factors generate a stochastic trend in the A share price premium. A stochastic trend in the A share price premium is possible in a segmented market. If A and B share prices have different stochastic trends, they are not cointegrated. Lack of a common trend between A and B share prices suggests that domestic and foreign investors have different information sets or view risk in different ways. Then prices move independently in the long run. Cointegration implies causality and information flow between the two investor groups in at least one direction.
Panel Data Tests
Panel data tests for unit roots and cointegration are based on pooling information in the individual tests. We combine the p-values from standard Augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF) unit root tests and likelihood ratio (LR) tests for cointegration. The idea of combining the p-values from individual tests was first suggested by Fisher (1932) , and introduced in econometrics for panel data unit root tests by Maddala and Wu (1999).
Panel Unit Root and Cointegration Tests
Consider a panel data set of N cross-section units observed over T time periods. Let i = 1, . . . , N index the cross-section units and t = 1 . . . , T the time periods. The number of time-series observations for each cross-section unit can be different, and then the panel is said to be unbalanced. If there is a common T for all crosssection units, the panel is balanced.
The Augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF) unit root test is based on the model 
where Π i j are p×p parameter matrices and µ i is a p×1 vector. The corresponding heterogenous error correction model is
where Π i is a p × p matrix of rank r i ≤ p and Γ i j
are p × p matrices. The cointegrating rank hypothesis is formulated as
The LR trace statistic for the hypotheses (5) is
where the eigenvalues λ 
The Fisher Test
The Fisher (1932) test was suggested in econometrics by Maddala and Wu (1999) , and is based on combining the p-values from the individual tests. Let p i denote the observed p-values from the individual unit root or cointegration tests. The statistic is given by
The test is an exact, non-parametric test. The Λ statistic has a χ 2 distribution with 2N degrees of freedom under the null hypothesis. An advantage of the Fisher test is that the panel can be unbalanced, which is the case in our applications in Section 5. Another advantage is that different lag lengths can be used in the individual ADF and LR tests.
Note that the Fisher test depends on the assumption of independence of the p-values, since it uses the reproductive property of independent χ 2 variables. If the independence assumption is violated, an asymptotic test can be constructed using
where
The limiting distribution of the Λ statistic of the asymptotic Fisher test is the standard normal N(0, 1) distribution. The rejection region is one-sided, and the test rejects for large values of Λ.
Empirical Results
This section reports the empirical results of the panel data tests. If domestic and foreign investors have different information, but there is an exchange of information between the two markets, we would expect that the A share price premium is stationary, and the A and B share prices are cointegrated. We test if the A share price premium (ln P A i t
) is stationary. Due to market segmentation and information differences, there might not be a one-to-one (homogenous) relation between the A and B share prices. The cointegration test allows for a non-homogenous relation by testing whether the unrestricted vector β = (1, −β) multiplied by the log price vector Y i t
) form a stationary relation. In this case, ln P A i t − β ln P B i t is a stationary process, and β can differ from one.
In Section 5.1 we test for a unit root in the A share price premium. In Section 5.2 we test for cointegration between the A and B share prices. In Section 5.3 we report probit estimates of the characteristics of firms with cointegrated A and B share prices. The number of observations available for the individual unit root and cointegration tests, the individual ADF and LR statistics, and p-values are reported in Tables A.2 and A.3 in the appendix.
Panel Data Unit Root Tests
Define the A share price premium as
where P A i t and P B i t denote the A and B share prices. We test for a unit root in s i t using a standard ADF unit root test. In all models we include a constant and use lag length k = 1. For most firms k = 1 is sufficient, and for simplicity we want to impose a common lag length in all tests. We denote the ADF statistics by τ µ i .
The asymptotic critical value using the significance level 5% is −2.86. The ADF test is invalid if there is a structural break in the sample. Since there is a structural break after the A and B share markets were partially merged in February 2001, the tests are computed for the sample period up to the break and after the break. Table 2 reports the means of the ADF statistics and p-values for both markets, and the Shanghai and Shenzhen markets, and both sample periods. The Fisher statistics reported in Table 2 are computed using the p-values from the individual ADF tests and (7). We have also computed the asymptotic Fisher test based on (8), as a way of dealing with cross-section dependence. In Table 2 we see that we cannot reject the null hypothesis of a unit root in the A share price premium for the sample period 1993(1)-2000 (11) . For the sample period 2001(2)-2002(7), after the markets were partially merged, we clearly reject a unit root. Figure  2 plots the histograms of the p-values for both markets, and the Shanghai and Shenzhen markets, and both sample periods. We see that for the first sample period, there are only a few small p-values. For the second sample period, most p-values are small. Note that in Figure 1 , the A and B share prices converge immediately after the markets were partially merged. As the markets were partially merged, and arbitrage is indirectly allowed, information is more efficiently transferred between the two markets, and the A share price premium decreases and becomes stationary.
Panel Data Cointegration Tests
We test for cointegration between the A and B share prices using Johansen's (1996) . Notes: N is the number of units, k is the lag length in the ADF tests, τ µ is the mean of the ADF statistics, p is the mean of the p-values, Λ is the Fisher statistic computed using (7) and Λ is the asymptotic Fisher statistic computed using (8) . (11) . Table 3 reports the means of the LR statistics and p-values for both markets, and the Shanghai and Shenzhen markets. The Fisher statistics reported in Table  3 are computed using the p-values from the individual LR tests and (7). We have also computed the asymptotic Fisher test based on (8) . In Table 3 we see that we can accept cointegration for both markets, and the Shanghai and Shenzhen markets. Figure 3 plots the histograms of the p-values for both markets, and the Shanghai and Shenzhen markets. The histograms show that there are more small p-values for the cointegration tests than for the unit root tests in Figure 2 . The conclusion from our LR tests for cointegration is that we find cointegration between the A and B share prices in the panel. Table 3 : Panel data tests for cointegration between A and B share prices. Notes: N is the number of units, LR is the mean of the LR statistics, p is the mean of the p-values, Λ is the Fisher statistic computed using (7) and Λ is the asymptotic Fisher statistic computed using (8) . 
Probit Analysis
The individual tests in our panel show that the A and B share prices are not cointegrated for all firms. We estimate a probit model to identify the characteristics of firms with cointegrated A and B share prices. Define a binary dependent variable
where p i denote the p-values from the individual LR tests for cointegration between the A and B share prices. Table 4 reports probit estimates with firm characteristics and industry dummies as explanatory variables. The model is estimated for the sample period 1993(1)-2000 (11) . The empirical results were obtained using Limdep Nlogit 3.01 (Greene, 2002) . Note that the standard errors reported in Table 4 are probably too small, since they do not take account of the fact that the p-values defining the dependent variable are estimates. There are seven industrial sectors, but only the dummy for the service sector is significant and the manufacturing sector is the only insignificant sector with a t-statistic greater than one. The other sectors are not significant and therefore left out in the final estimates. The explanatory variables are the ratio of the firm's B share market capitalisation to the firm's total A and B share market capitalisation (bmcap), the A share price premium (premium), the number of years the firm has listed B shares (age) and turnover of the firm's B shares (turnover). The model is statistically significant, since the value of the LR statistic is 34.423, with p-value 0.000. Both the industry dummies and the explanatory variables are jointly significant. The industry dummy Ds for services is statistically significant, but the industry dummy Dm for manufacturing is not. Of the explanatory variables, age is the only statistically significant variable. The coefficient on age is negative. Firms that issued B shares a long time ago are still valued very differently by the two investor groups. Information about firms that listed their B shares recently flows more efficiently between the two investor groups. The fact that the variable age is statistically significant with a negative coefficient is bad news for Chinese policy makers, who expect that B share listing in itself would increase transparency and improve management of old Chinese state-owned firms.
Conclusions
By asking whether the prices of Chinese domestic investors' A shares and foreign investors' B shares are cointegrated, we study a fundamental aspect of information asymmetry and diffusion in segmented capital markets. Different from other emerging markets, Chinese firms' A shares have traded at a large premium over B shares. Previous findings of a unit root in the A share price premium and no cointegration between A and B share prices suggest that domestic and foreign investors have different information sets and do not share information in the long run.
In this paper we use panel data methods to test whether the A share price premium is stationary, and the A and B share prices are cointegrated. The individual unit root tests and tests for cointegration are standard Augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF) unit root tests and likelihood ratio (LR) tests. The panel data tests are based on the Fisher (1932) test suggested by Maddala and Wu (1999) . For the sample period up to February 2001, it is not possible to reject the hypothesis of a unit root in the A share price premium. In February 2001, the A and the B shares markets were partially merged, and domestic investors were allowed to trade B shares as well as A shares. The policy change lead to a stationary A share price premium.
Using panel data cointegration tests, we find that the A and B shares prices are cointegrated. We therefore conclude that domestic and foreign investors share information in the long run. Finding cointegration between A and B share prices in a panel does not mean that all individual firms' A and B share prices are cointegrated. To find which firms' share prices are cointegrated, we estimate a probit model. The results show that firms that issued B shares a long time ago are more likely to be valued differently by domestic and foreign investors, in the sense that the A and B shares prices are not cointegrated. Cointegration is more likely to be found for firms in the service sector and for firms that listed their B shares recently. Our empirical results suggest it was a success to abolish some of the restrictions in 2001, since the premium on A shares decreased and became stationary. Consequently, the degree of asymmetric information and the relative cost of foreign financing have fallen as well.
computed because there are not enough observations. The appendix is available at http://www.shh.fi/~ahlgren/.
